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rozwoju	 funkcji	 finansowych	w	Budapeszcie,	Warszawie	 i	 Pradze.	Dowodzi,	 że	 pomimo	braku	
wyraźnych	przejawów	tworzenia	międzynarodowych	centrów	finansowych	w	okresie	transformacji	
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Global	 financial	 capital	 has	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 all	 transition	
economies.	Foreign	direct	investment	in	the	banking	sector	is	closely	connected	
to	the	transition	process	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	(CEE)	and	has	received	
considerable	 attention	 from	 both	 a	 theoretical	 and	 an	 empirical	 perspective.	
However,	much	 less	 attention	 has	 been	 devoted	 to	 the	major	 determinants	 of	






the	 traditional	dominance	of	financial	 capitals,	 led	by	London	and	New	York,	
and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 by	 second	 and	 third	 tier	 international	 financial	 centres	
(Faulconbridge	et	al.,	2007;	Engelen	and	Grote,	2009;	Gál,	2010a).	Despite	the	
growing	body	of	literature	(Grote,	2008;	Engelen,	2007;	Wójcik,	2007;	Boschma	
and	Ledder,	 2010;	Zademach	 and	Musil,	 2012)	 on	 the	 development	 of	 global	
financial	centres,	very	little	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	evolution	of	financial	
centres	 in	peripheral	or	emerging	 regions	 (Poon,	2003,	Karreman	and	van	der	
Knaap,	2009;	Zhao	et	al.,	2013)	
Despite	the	geographic	dispersal	of	financial	services,	the	increased	importance	
of	 central	 coordination	 and	 control	 functions	 is	 the	 main	 characteristics	 of	
IFCs.	A	financial	centre	is	defined	as	a	large	city	with	an	agglomeration	of	the	
headquarters	 of	 the	 largest	 financial	 firms	 providing	 all	 banking	 and	 financial	
services,	nationally	or	internationally	(Porteous,	1999;	Cassis,	2010).	The	term	
is	used	for	strategic	urban	locations	where	the	financial	sector	plays	a	dominant	
role	 in	 the	 local	and/or	global	economy,	as	measured	by	 the	share	of	financial	
services	in	national	income,	GDP,	or	in	total	employment,	and	by	the	presence	of	
foreign	banks.	Apparently,	financial	sector	agglomeration	reflects	and	reinforces	
‘real	 economy’	concentrations,	 as	firms	 tend	 to	agglomerate	 similarly	 to	other	
advanced	producer	service	providers	in	order	to	achieve	the	location	advantages	
of	urbanization	economies	(Porteous,	1999).	Financial	centres	can	be	classified,	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 geographic	 influence,	 as	 national,	 regional	 (international	





These	 international	 financial	 centres,	 which	 are	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 global	
cities,	have	developed	a	dense	network	of	linkages,	and	provide	a	full-spectrum	
of	advanced	producer	services.	Most	of	the	major	international	financial	centres	
are	 also	world	 cities	 (Sassen,	 2004;	Taylor,	 2004).	These	 global	 centres	 have	
massive	 concentration	 of	 resources	 that	 allow	 them	 to	maximize	 the	 benefits	
of	 information	 and	 connectivity,	 with	 other	 centres	 generating	 asymmetric	
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power	 relations	 executed	 through	 their	 affiliates,	which	 are	 the	 key	mediators	
of	their	command	and	control	functions.	Key	social	and	information-generating	
processes	occurring	in	IFCs,	such	as	face-to-face	contact,	are	facilitated	by	a	high	
degree	 of	 social	 proximity.	 IFCs	 are	 also	 a	 gateway	 for	 financial	 services	 for	
other	 lower	 tier	 centres.	 The	 emergence	 of	 IFCs	 depends	 on	 several	 factors,	
among	 which	 the	 most	 important	 are:	 (1)	 the	 size	 of	 the	 domestic	 economy,	
(2)	 the	 information	 hinterland,	 and	 (3)	 path	 dependence	 (Cassis,	 2011).	 Scale	
economies,	 together	with	 the	diversity	of	 the	financial	 sector,	 are	a	key	 factor	
explaining	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 financial	 centre.	The	 concept	 of	 an	 information	
hinterland	defines	a	geographical	area	for	which	the	financial	centre	provides	an	




as	well	as	 the	 impact	of	 the	economic	crisis,	are	 likely	 to	differ	 from	those	of	
higher-rank	international	financial	centres.	
Central	and	Eastern	European	finnacial	centres	are	neglected	from	this	point	
of	 view,	 and	Karreman’s	 (2009)	 or	Wójcik’s	 (2007)	 studies	 on	 contemporary	
financial	geographies	of	Eastern	Europe	do	not	provide	a	detailed	overview	of	







development	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 in	 European	 emerging	markets	 is	 largely	
dependent	 on	 foreign	 investments,	 explicit	 attention	 is	 directed	 to	 determine	
which	 CEE	 centres	 exhibit	 sufficient	 power	 to	 attract	 multinational	 financial	
service	firms	 and	 develop	 certain	 international	 functions.	The	 paper	 examines	
whether	the	concentration	of	command	and	control	functions	over	CEE	within	
the	Western	 European	 IFC	 network	make	 it	 possible	 to	 develop	 paralell	 IFC	
function	in	CEE	capital	cities.	




about	 the	 ongoing	 competition	 among	 the	 CEE	metropolises.	 The	 paper	 also	









have	been	collected.	Primary	data	 is	collected	 from	national	 statistical	offices,	













Impact of transition on the formation of International Financial Centres 
Since	 the	 early	 1990s	 CEE	 countries	 went	 through	 fundamental	 political,	
economic,	 and	 institutional	 transitions	 on	 the	 way	 from	 a	 centrally	 planned	




Most	 of	 the	 literature	 studying	 the	 transition	 process	 has	 described	 the	
transformation	 and	 the	 (re)-integration	 of	 the	 region	 into	 the	 global	 capitalist	
system	as	a	linear	convergence	with	the	advanced	market	economies,	following	
the	 path	 of	 liberalization	 and	 privatization.	 However,	 there	 is	 considerable	
diversity	among	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries,	due	to	their	different	
legacies,	varieties	of	implemented	transformation	models,	and	economic	policies	
(Sokol,	 2001).1	 The	 crisis	 further	 strengthened	 these	 different	 developmental	
trends,	resulting	in	diverging	economies	and	regions	within	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe.
Concerning	 IFC	 formations	 there	were	 three	 parallel	 processes,	 namely	 the	
post-socialist transition, financialization, and world-city formation,	 which	 not	




(e.g.	 IMF).	 The	 international	 situation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 which	 the	 change	 of	
1	 Sokol	 (2001)	 puts	 the	CEE	 transition	 into	 the	 context	 of	 the	 centre-periphery	model	 and	
divides	 the	 regions	by	different	 subregions:	 ‘Super-periphery	A’	 (ECE	and	Baltic	 states)	 have	
a	more	solid	economic	structure,	legacy	of	modernization,	and	more	experience	with	market	and	




the	twentieth	century,	namely,	globalisation and (neoliberal) economic paradigm 
change.	 These	 developments	 not	 only	 contributed	 to	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Soviet	
bloc,	 they	 also	 created	 rather	 strict	 economic	 conditions	 for	 post-communist	
countries	about	to	reintegrate	into	the	global	market	economy.	In	the	course	of	
this	 transition,	CEE	countries	had	 to	adjust	 to	 the modus operandi	 of	 a	world	
economy	 fraught	 by	 shocks	 and	 uncertainties	 (debt	 crisis,	money	market	 and	
currency	 crises),	 driven	by	 competition,	which	 could	 sometimes	be	 extremely	











process	 is	 heavily	 influenced	by	dependence	on	 foreign	financial	 inflows,	 and	
generally	by	 the	high	 level	of financialization (Myant	and	Drahokupil,	2012).	
Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 (FDI)	 inflow	 into	CEE	economies	 has	 been	 a	 vital	
factor	 in	the	first	stage	of	privatisation,	and	FDI	became	the	predominant	 type	
of	 incoming	 capital	 investment	 in	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 economic	 transition.	
The	banking	and	insurance	sectors	were	the	primary	targets	of	strategic	foreign	
investors,	 resulting	 in	 significant	 inflows	 of	 FDI	 into	 these	 sectors,	 connected	




financing.	Other	 forms	 of	 private	 flows,	 such	 as	 equity	 investment,	 increased	
as	the	local	blue	chip	companies	started	to	attract	more	foreign	capital	through	
revitalised	 local	 stock	exchanges.	The	most	 important	 form	of	financialization	
was	driven	by	an	increase	in	domestic	consumption	credit.	
The network of world cities was another	determining	factor	for	the	formation	
of	IFCs	in	the	1990s. The	rapid	integration	of	economies	through	the	structural	
effects	of	globalisation	on	production,	financial	transactions,	and	wealth	creation	
have	also	stimulated	 the	 formation of world cities (Lo	and	Yeung,	1998).	This	











In	 this	 regard,	 pressures	 of	 globalization,	 particularly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 city	
competion	 for	 attracting	 investments	 and	 improving	 their	 position	 within	
international	 urban	 networks,	 have	 posed	 significant	 challenges	 for	 the	
transforming	 capital	 cities	 of	 CEE	 countries.	 The	 capital	 cities	 of	 the	 most	
dynamically	reforming	states	of	Poland,	Hungary,	and	the	Czech	Republic	were	
the	most	 exposed	 to	 globalization	 and	EU	 integration,	 and	 have	 been	 playing	
a	leading	role	in	their	transforming	economies.	
The	 transformation	 and	 modernization	 of	 capital	 cities	 were	 characterised	
by	 two	 simultanous	 processes.	 First, metropolitan transformation	 has	 led	 to	
important	 structural	 changes	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 characterised	 by	
economic	 restructuring,	 and	 by	 the	 shift	 from	 industrial	 to	 service	 economy.	
Second, the international integration	of	the	capitals	of	the	Visegrád	Group2	into	
the	global	world-city	networks	has	played	a	key	role	in	the	formation	of	IFCs.	






















Development of functions of national and international financial centres in 







Hungary’s	financial	 sector	 reintegrated	 into	a	global	financial	 system	 that	was	
shaped	by	powerful	processes	of	globalization.	A	common	characteristic	of	the	
spatial	organization	of	the	Hungarian	banking	system	before	and	after	the	political	




the	 separation	 of	 central	 banking	 and	 commercial	 banking	 functions	 in	 1987,	
a	two-tier	system	was	established	from	above	and	was	supervised	by	a	central	
authority.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 financial	 resources	 were	 mainly	 concentrated	 in	
the	capital	cities	as	a	 legacy	of	 the	centrally	managed	state	economy.	Its	main	
command	and	control	functions	were	already	strongly	centralised	in	capital	cities,	
like	Budapest.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	new	system	practically	 reproduced	 the	earlier	
Budapest-centred,	 over-centralised	 state-socialist	 mono-bank	 structure,	 even	




centre.	 International	 relations	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 are	 administered	 via	 the	
capital	city.	All	institutions	and	functions	associated	with	these	roles	are	located	
there.	 Budapest	 has	 the	 only	 stock	 exchange	 in	 the	 country.	 It	 concentrates	
the	head	offices	of	banks,	 insurance	companies,	 specialised	credit	 institutions,	
building	societies,	mortgage	banks,	and	lease	companies.	The	significance	of	the	
capital’s	special	strategic	geographical	location	in	the	national	financial	system	

















Dependent	 market	 economies3	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 are	 heavy	
importers	 of	 capital,	 therefore	 the	 ratio	 of	 inward	 and	 outward	 FDI	 stock	 is	
much	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 EU-15,	 due	 to	 the	 low	 level	 of	 capital	 exports	 from	
these	 countries	 (Nölke	 and	Vliegenthart,	 2009).	 Foreign	 financial	 inflows	 and	




domestic	 to	 foreign	 owners	 through	 privatisation.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 2007	 private	
foreign	 ownership	 already	 accounted	 for	 about	 80%	 of	 banks’	 assets	 in	 the	
CEE	region.4	Hungarian	financial	markets,	similarly	to	other	CEE	counterparts,	







Unlike	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 where	 voucher-based	 mass	 privatization	 was	
followed	by	a	relatively	belated	recapitalization	and	foreignization	of	the	banking	
sector,	or	in	Poland,	where	not	only	a	belated	banking	reform	but	also	a	gradual	
and	 well-regulated	 privatization	 made	 much	 more	 room	 for	 the	 state	 and	
privately	owned	domestic	banks,	the	rapid	‘de-nationalisation’	and	foreignization	
of	the	Hungarian	banking	system	was	unique	in	the	region	in	the	begining	of	the	
transition	period.5	 It	 created	a	peculiar	ownership	 structure,	differing	 from	 the	
majority	 of	 developed	 countries	 as	well,	 in	which	 the share of foreign-owned 
banks reached	around	75%	by	2000	(Gál,	2005).	Foreign	financial	inflows	have	
resulted	 in	 dramatic	 changes	 of	 ownership	 structures	 throughout	 the	 region.	
In	 1994,	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	 early	 transition	 crises,	 an	 overwhelming	majority	






5	 This	 rapid	 privatization	 of	 the	 banking	 sector	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 bankruptcies	 and	 the	













Economies	 (LME),	 or	 domestic	 credit	 as	 in	 Coordinated	 Market	 Economies	
(CME).	Although	FDI	does	play	a	role	in	the	other	capitalist	models,	the	degree	
of	external	dependency	is	much	more	extreme	in	the	CEE	(Raviv,	2008).	Foreign	
banks	 (understandably)	 followed	 commercial	 market-seeking	 principles,	 and	
even	the	governments	of	host	countries	were	not	active	in	gearing	or	‘diverting’	
them	through	various	regulations	towards	addressing	the	development	needs	of	
their	 economies.	 ‘Rather,	 they	were	 always	 aimed	 at	 redressing	 the	 declining	
profitability	 of	 financial	 institutions	 operating	 in	 the	 already	 financialised	
economies	 of	 Western	 Europe.	 As	 a	 result,	 foreign	 financiers	 emerged	 as	
a	 powerful	 rentier	 class	 in	Central	 Europe	 able	 to	 extract	 rent	 incomes	 far	 in	
excess	of	their	profits	in	the	west’	(Raviv,	2008,	p.	311).	
DMEs	are	 is	characterised	by	an	unequal	power	 relation	between	 the	home	
countries	 and	 the	CEECs	 through	 parent-subsidiary	 networks	 of	TNCs.	 ‘Dual	
banking	 system’	 model,	 characterized	 by	 the	 dominance	 of	 foreign-owned	
commercial	 banks,	 became	 common	 in	 these	 economies	 (Alessandrini	 and	
Zazzaro,	1999;	Gál,	2005).	Dual–economies	literature	argues	that	FDI	generates	
typical	 core-periphery	 disparities	 between	 old	 and	 new	Member	 States.	 That	
model,	 consisting	 of	 large	 foreign	 banks	 and	 small	 local/indigenous	 banks,	












investors	 in	 finance,	 explicit	 attention	 is	 directed	 at	 determining	 which	 CEE	
financial	 centres	 attract	 multinational	 financial	 firms,	 and	 Karreman	 (2009)	







preconditions	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 IFC.	 It	 also	 tries	 to	find	market	 evidence	
showing	 some	 signs	 of	 IFC	 formation,	with	 a	 particular	 regional	 focus	 in	 the	
three	cities.	
As	we	noted	before,	the	capital	cities	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	became	










banking	 firms,	Warsaw	 ranked	 9th	 in	 Europe,	 followed	 by	 Prague	 (17th)	 and	
Budapest	(19th).8 
Csomós	(2011)	compared	these	capital	cities	on	the	basis	of	 their	economic	
strength	measured	 by	GDP	 (PPS).	 In	 2008,	Warsaw,	with	 68Bn	USD,	 ranked	
85th	(followed	by	Hamburg),	Budapest	with	53	Bn	USD	was	100th	and	Prague	
was	 the	106th.	Functions	of	 coordination	and	control	 can	be	measured	by	 the	
number	 of	 corporate	 headquarters	 of	 domestic	 companies	 located	 in	 these	
capitals.9	 Multinational	 companies	 and	 banks	 prefer	 to	 hierarchically	 control	
local	 subsidiaries	 from	 the	 headquarters	 of	 their	 parent	 banks	 located	 in	 the	
IFCs	outside	 the	CEE	region	(Myant,	Drahokoupil,	2010). From	the	emerging	
international	 financial	 centre	 funtions	 point	 of	 view,	 headquarters	 of	 locally	























demonstrating	 the	growing	 importance	of	financial	 centre	 functions	 (Table	 1).	
The	relative	weight	of	its	finacial	sector	corresponds	with	the	share	of	the	leading	
global	 IFCs.	 Contrary	 to	Warsaw,	 Budapest	 shows	 the	 lowest	 relative	weight	
of	 this	sector,	which	also	demonstrates	higher	volatility	and	very	slow	growth	
during	the	entire	transition	period.	
Table 1. Share of Financial sector in total employment of the capital cities (%)
% of total 
employment
Budapest Warsaw Prague
1995 2002 2013 1995 2001 2013 1995 2001 2013
Financial 
Intermediation (K)
3.5 3.8 4.3 6.0 7.8 10.6 3.2 4.9 6.3
The	relative	importance	of	the	financial	sector	in	the	three	cities	is	evaluated	by	
calculating	location	quotients	(LQ).11	According	to	the	domestic	LQ,	Warsaw’s	
financial	 sector	 dominance	 within	 the	 Polish	 economy	 is	 clearly	 marked	 by	






significantly	 exceeds	 it,	 demonstrating	 the	 successful	 adaptation	 of	 the	 Polish	














Table 2. Domestic (Dom LQ) and Inter-city (IC LQ) Location quotients of capital cities on 













K (2001) 5.5 0.8 1.9 1.0 2.4 1.2 2.6
K (2013) 7.0 0,6 2.0 0.9 3.3 1.5 4.4
1 Intercity LQ (IC LQ)
2 Domestic LQ (Dom LQ)
Source: Bourdeau-Lepage, 2003, author’s calulation based on data of Central statistical offices. 
Size	of	banking	sector	within	the	economy





Table 3. Overview of banking sector developments, 2005–2013
%
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
2005 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013






Bank assets/financial assets, % 81.1 68.8 86.2 76.6 84.8 70.0
Share of foreign banks  
(% of total asstes)
94.5 83 84.5 67* 69.9 62
Banking assets/GDP 101.0 135 90.1 108.0 62.4 86.2
Loans to private sector/GDP 17.6 22.5 26.0 23.2 16.5 17.0
Loans to househods/GDP 12.7 28.4 17.2 23.7 31.0 37.0
Total deposit/GDP 62.7 86.7 39.3 43.1 32.9 47.5
Loans in foreign currency  
(% of total loans)
13 18 38.6 51 26.2 30.0
Loan-to-deposit, % 63.7 75.0 113 110 78.8 108.0
ROA (return on asstes) 1.4 1.4 2.2 0.5 1.6 1.1
* Data for 2009.








by	 assets	 per	 GDP,	 was	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 (101	 and	 135%	
respectively)	and	the	lowest	in	Poland	(62.4	and	86%).	Hungary	with	its	figures	














Table 4. Offices of 15 largest private investment banks in three CEE capital cities, 2005
Warsaw Prague Budapest
J.P. Morgan X X –
Merill Lynch X – –
Morgan Stanley – – –
Goldman Sachs – – –
Deutsche Bank X X X
Citibank X X X
Bank of New York – – –
Barclays – – –
State Street – X –
UBS X X –
Nomura – – X
Credit Suisse FB X – –
Shroeders – – –
Lehman Brothers – – –
HSBC X X X
Brown Brothers Harriman – – –
Total 7 (2) 6 (1) 4 (1)
(1) Bank office is exclusively located in only one out of the three cities. 









investment	 banks	 than	 all	 their	 counterparts	 put	 together.	 In	 2011	 Goldman	
Sachs	opened	its	Warsaw	investment	banking	office,	considering	Warsaw	as	an	
important	financial	hub	with	huge	development	potential	 for	 the	whole	 region	
(Hashimoto,	2015).
Cross-border	flows	in	the	financial	sector	
Cross	 border	 financial	 flows	 and	 their	 direction	 (inflows-outflows,	 capital	
import-export)	are	one	of	the	major	indicators	of	the	international	integration	of	
IFCs.13	During	the	first	phase	of	transition,	FDI	was	the	most	important	source	





greater	 potential	 to	 attaract	 new	 strategic	 investments	 in	 the	 Polish	 financial	
sector.	Changes	 in	 FDI	flows	 during	 the	 crisis	 period	were	 substantial.	While	
there	was	a	smaller	fall	of	FDI	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	a	larger	one	in	Poland	





of	corporate	 lending	and	60%	of	 interbank	lending	 in	2009	was	 the	subject	of	
cross-border	 transactions,	 which	 not	 only	 has	 an	 implication	 for	 increasing	
international	integrartion	of	CEE	financial	markets	by	strengthening	connectivity	
to	the	European	IFCs,	but	also,	these	links	generated	imbalances	in	the	banking	
system	 during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 crisis,	 as	 the	 CEE	 remained	 largely	 reliant	 on	
cross-border	 lending.	Hungary	experienced	higher	cross-border	 lending,	which	
is	 expected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 economic	 fundamentals,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 had	
developed	significant	vulnerabilities	in	the	pre-crisis	period.	This	resulted	in	the	


















CZ HU PL SK SI
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 1. FDI stock in financial services, 2006–2011 (million Euros)
Source: National banks.
Another	 parallel	 process,	 namely	 the	 rapid	 surge	 in	 outward	 foreign	 direct	
investment	 (OFDI)	 generated	 by	 the	 cross-border	 activities	 of	 locally-based	
multinational	 banks,	 made	 Hungarian	 companies	 prominent	 foreign	 investors	
in	 the	wider	Eastern	European	 region.	Financial	 capital	 export	 to	Eastern	 and	














Hungary 1.4 39.8 95.0 43.2
Poland 7.2 40.9 138.0 120.6
Czech Republlic 7.2 17.3 54.0 51.2








feature	 of	 these	 leading	 cities	 is	 the	 considerable	 concentration	 of	 financial	
capital,	 not	 only	 in	 banking	 but	 also	 in	 stock	 markets.	 Data	 on	 total	 market	
capitalisation	and	the	number	of	companies	listed	on	stock	exchanges,	therefore,	
serves	 as	 an	 ideal	 index	 for	measuring	financial	 centre	development.	 It	 has	 to	
be	 noted	 that	 stock	 exchanges	 in	 the	CEE	 countries	 have	 taken	 a	 fairly	 short	
period	of	 time	to	reach	 their	 recent	potential.	There	are	no	 large	companies	 in	
the	 region	 with	 longer	 stock	 market	 experience	 and	 none	 of	 the	 institutional	
investors	has	 long	history	of	presence	 in	 the	region.	All	CEE	stock	exchanges	















Despite	 its	 slow	 start,	 the	 Warsaw	 stock	 exchange	 rapidly	 increased	 its	







































































































































































































































































































The	 stake	 of	 the	 ongoing	 race	 among	metropolises	 in	 Eastern	 and	 Central	
Europe	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	2000s	was	 in	part	whether	Budapest,	with	 the	
relatively	most	developed	fi	nancial	markets	at	that	time,	could	become	a	regional	




























1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Budapest SE Prague Warsaw SE Wiener Börse
Figure 2. Total market capitalisation in Million USD
Source: Edited by the author, World Federation of Exchanges, Annual Reports and Statistics.
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developed	 its	 own	 command	 and	 control	 functions	 over	 subsidiaries	 located	
abroad	(Gál,	2010b).	OTP’s	expansion	abroad	since	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	
increased	 the	connectivity	of	Budapest	 as	 a	 regional	finacial	 centre.	However,	
the	regional	banking	networks	alone	do	not	make	a	city	an	international	financial	
centre	–	especially	when	capital	markets	are	concerned.	
In	 other	 respects,	 however,	 Budapest	 is	 not	 unique	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	
regional	capitals	(Parague,	Warsaw),	which	are	rapidly	catching	up	–	they	had	





However,	 already	 during	 the	 2000s	 there	 were	 serious	 impediments	 to	
Budapest’s	becoming	an	international	financial	centre.	Its	previous	competitive	
advantage	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 and	 capital-attracting	 potential	 gradually	
decreased	due	to	the	deteriorating	macro-economic	position	of	the	contry	prior	
to	the	crisis.	The	competitive	advantage	of	Budapest	was	also	weakened	by	the	





In	 Budapest,	 despite	 a	 suitable	 supply	 of	 highly	 qualified	 professionals,	
qualifications	of	 the	available	workforce	still	 fall	 short	of	 international	quality	
standards.	 In	 an	 interview,	 the	CEO	 of	 a	US-owned	 bank	 emphasised	 that	 in	
certain	 areas	 of	 finance	 (accounting,	 cost-management,	 marketing	 and	 sales),	















favourable	 preconditions	 that	 supported	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 first	 group	 of	 capital	 cities,	 such	






vertical	 investments	 across	 national	 boundaries	 are	 seeking	 low-cost	 global	
locations	 within	 transnational production systems.	 The	 demand-led	 market	
seeking	investments	(such	as	financial	FDI)	were	the	most	common	throughout	
the	begining	of	 the	 transition	period	 in	CEE	(Hardy	et	al.,	2011).	Due	 to	 their	
low	level	of	terriorial	embeddeness,	SSCs’	impact	on	their	host	location	is	rather	
limited.	Consequently,	SSC	locations	can	not	result	in	a	natural	evolution	to	an	
IFC,	as	 it	 lacks	the	geographical	concentration	of	 indigenous	and	international	
financial	 firms	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 command	 and	 control	 functions	 from	 their	
headquarters	(Bellon,	1998;	Pelly,	2001).




















Concerning	 the	 transmission	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 CEE,	 there	 are	 two	 distinct	
approaches	 in	 the	 transition	 literature.	According	 to	 Myant	 and	 Drahokoupil	
(2012),	the	financial	crisis	was	an	external	shock	to	the	CEE	region	and	affected	
countries	 in	 different	ways,	where	 finacial	 inflows	 and	 export	 flows	were	 the	
transmission	 channels	 of	 the	 contagion.	 The	 other	 arguments	 emphasize	 that	
the	crisis	cannot	simply	be	understood	as	an	internal	adjustment	to	an	external	
shock	 (Bohle,	 2011);	 rather,	 the	 global	 financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 exposed	
the	weaknesses	 of	 the	 post-socialist	 neo-liberal	 economic	 development	model	





in	 CEE	 (EBRD	 Transition	 Report,	 2009).	 Smith	 and	 Swain	 (2010)	 focus	 on	







increasingly	 vulnerable	 to	 external	 shocks	 due	 to	 unsustainable	 trajectories	 of	
credit-fuelled	 housing	 and	 consumption	 booms,	 high	 current-account	 deficits,	
and	quickly	rising	external	debt	(a	large	proportion	of	it	denominated	in	foreign	

















(measured	by	 loans	 to	 the	nonfinancial	 corporate	 sector).22	The	 crisis	has	 also	
altered	the	future	growth	prospects	of	these	CEE	countries;	monetary	and	fiscal	
policies	are	on	a	tightening	course	for	several	years	and	there	is	little	room	for	
powerful	 countercyclical	 policy	 responses.	 External	 capital	 inflows	 suddenly	
and	 significantly	 stopped	 despite	 the	 relatively	 quick	 recovery	 in	 the	 region. 
For	example,	 in	Hungary,	despite	 its	 recovery,	 the	scale	of	 investment	and	 the	
financial	intermediation	sector	remained	much	below	its	pre-crisis	level.
The	 financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 has	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 international	
financial	centre	position	of	the	capital	cities	studied.	Various	data	on	banking	and	
capital	markets	(lending	activity,	market	capitalisation)	illustrates	the	fluctuation	




22	 The	 current	 FDI	 literature (Claessens	 and	 van	 Horen,	 2012)	 focusing	 on	 the	 impact	 of	






in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2000s	 was	 accompanied	 by	 not	 only	 a	 less	 spectacular	
recovery,	but	also	by	the	rise	of	Warsaw,	especially	after	the	2008	financial	crisis.	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 recent	financial	 crisis	had	a	visible	effect	on	Warsaw	
in	2008	and	2011,	it	recovered	faster	than	other	financial	centres	in	the	region.	
In	this	regard	there	are	two	effects	in	play	–	the	country	effect	and	the	financial	
center	 effect.	Poland	was	not	only	able	 to	 avoid	 the	 recession,	but	well-timed	
regulations	managed	to	prevent	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble.	Foreign	capital	
inflow	was	not	significantly	affected.	Warsaw	experienced	a	tremendous	scale	of	
















banking	 sector	 as	 the	 banking	 market	 was	 prudent,	 and	 the	 share	 of	 foreign	
currency	loans,	which	proved	to	be	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	subprime,	
was	insignificant.	The	Czech	Republic	experienced	‘reverse	flows’	because	of	the	
decrease	 in	cross-border	 lending	 in	spite	of	 its	strong	economic	fundamentals.	
However,	 the	 indirect	 effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 became	 clearly	 visible	 in	 declining	
demand,	largest	pressure	on	profit,	efficiency	and	risk	management.	The	strong	
presence	 of	German	 and	Austrian	 retail	 banks	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	 and	 the	




Similarly	 to	 Prague,	 the	 development	 of	 financial	markets	 in	Budapest has	
been	 rather	weak,	 reflecting	 the	deteriorating	macroeconomic	 situation,	which	
started	long	before	the	crisis	and	was	chracterised	by	the	lack	of	strategic-minded	
long-term	 economic	 policies	 in	Hungary.	 Starting	 in	 the	 late	 1980s,	 Hungary	
was	a	pioneer	country	for	transition	success,	but	its	badly	designed	and	managed	





growth,	 became	 the	 source	 of	 relatively	 large	 accumulated	 private	 and	 public	










position.	The	 recent	 right-wing	government’s	campaign	against	 foreign-owned	
banks	 in	Budapest	presented	big	challenges	 to	Budapest’s	ambition	to	become	
an	 international	 financial	 centre.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 foreign	 capital	 inflow	 has	
stabilised	the	Hungarian	economy	and	even	developed	it	to	the	highest	level	in	
the	region	by	2004.	On	the	other	hand,	the	the	Hungarian	banking	system’s	over-





Republic	 and	Poland,	while	 decreasing	 in	Hungary.	The	 seemingly	 successful	
stabilization	programme	in	Hungary	could	not	take	advantage	of	conter-cyclical	
measures	until	recently,	due	to	the	huge	burden	of	public	and	private	indebtedness	
(the	 transfer	of	 foreign	currency	debt	 to	 local	currency	 that	was	decided	upon	
in	late	2014	could	cost	8%	of	the	GDP).	The	right-wing	government	launched	
a	 major	 re-nationalization	 program	 after	 2010,	 primarily	 in	 the	 energy	 and	
banking	sectors.	It	aims	to	increase	the	domestic/state	share	of	the	banking	sector,	
which	 reached	 more	 than	 50%	 by	 2015	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 purchased	 foreign	
owned	 subsidiaries.	 The	 Hungarian	 government	 heavily	 taxed	 foreign-owned	
banks	in	past	years,	and	therefore	the	Hungarian	financial	market	is	considered	
less	 attractive	 for	 foreign	 financial	 players.	 The	 nationalist	 approach	 strongly	






the	 transition	 period,	 assessing	 the	 preconditions	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 regional	











IFCs,	 reinforces	 the	high	 level	of	financial	dependence	of	CEE.	This	prevents	
the	development	of	fully-fledged	financial	centre	functions.	A	key	finding	of	our	
study	 is	 that	 despite	 these	 preconditions,	 carefully	 tailored	 economic	 policies	
combined	with	 city	branding	 strategy	make	 it	 possible	 to	develop	certain	 IFC	
functions	in	each	of	the	three	capital	cities,	providing	significant	benefits	through	












its	 previous	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 the	financial	 sector	 and	 declined	due	 to	
the	deteriorating	macro-economic	conditions	and	mismanaged	economic	policies	
long	before	the	crisis.	Budapest	has	not	become	a	regional	financial	centre	despite	
its	 favorable	preconditions,	which	 largely	 stemmed	 from	 the	 regional	network	










of	 the	 other	 financial	 centres.	 We	 argue	 that	 besides	 the	 lack	 of	 consistent	
economic	 policies	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 regulations	 that	 made	 the	 Hungarian	
financial	markets	vulnerable	during	the	crisis,	the	recent	nationalist	approaches	
of	the	government	(re-nationalization,	levy	on	banking)	have	further	weakened	
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